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ABSTRACT
The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar and multi-faceted world has
reduced the risk of conventional inter-state wars, but has been the cause of
several intra-state armed conflicts with an even higher risk of regional
instability. Such conflicts and the resurgence of a global activism have
produced a dramatic growth in peacekeeping requirements since the end of
the previous decade. The international response, mainly through the United
Nations (UN), has been to promote preventive diplomacy and, in a number
of cases, to conduct peace-support operations.
In brief, this paper points out that each UN peace-support operation
places an extremely high premium on UN administration, organisation, co-
ordination and resources. To this end, a multiplicity of contributions from
various role-players is needed. It also points out that peace-support
operations require significant commitments on the part of participating
states, specifically the willingness to accept financial costs and fatalities in
the interest of promoting international and regional stability. This is
especially true in the case of African peacekeeping.
This paper, furthermore, underscores the fact that the undertaking of
peace-support operations in Africa is by no means a simple and easy task.
The nature of peacekeeping missions in certain African countries have, in
fact, resulted in an increasing reluctance on the part of the major powers
and some of the other traditional troop-contributing nations to deploy on
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African soil. It concludes that the real impact of the post-Cold War era is
that the burden of resolving African conflicts rests more and more on
Africans. African countries and organisations are accordingly compelled to
take measures and develop strategies to address the peacekeeping
requirements on the continent.
INTRODUCTION
Although the formation of the UN was intended to deal with inter-state
warfare, it is being required more and more often to respond to intra-state
instability and conflict. In those conflicts the main aim, increasingly, is the
destruction not just of armed forces, but of civilians and even entire ethnic
groups. Conflict in the African environment poses a major challenge to UN
efforts designed to ensure global peace, prosperity and human rights for all.
In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted with armed
conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide
and resulting in 8 million refugees and displaced persons. The
consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts
to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its people. J
In a broader context the end of the Cold War has not resulted in
worldwide peace and stability. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar and
multifaceted world has in fact reduced the risk of conventional inter-state
wars, but has been the cause of several intra-state armed conflicts with an
even higher risk of regional instability. Such conflicts and the resurgence of
a global activism have produced a dramatic growth in peacekeeping
requirements since the end of the previous decade. The international
response, mainly through the UN, has been to promote preventive
diplomacy and, in a number of cases, to conduct peace-support operations.
In this regard, UN operations swiftly moved from traditional military
peacekeeping tasks to multidimensional operations in "failed" and
disintegrating states.
Research in the field of peacekeeping has focused on a wide range of
issues and has attracted a large academic
o
following. Much of this research
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has concentrated on what is theoretically desirable, whereas the political and
practical implications have often been neglected. This has promoted high
expectations of the peacekeeping role of the UN that cannot necessarily be
met.
In the following analysis, an overview is given of the authority and
competence to establish peace-support operations, as well as an outline of
the reasons for involvement in peace-support operations. This is followed
by an analysis of completed UN peace-support operations in Africa with
special reference to the factual situation regarding the strength, fatalities and
expenditures of each operation. The multiplicity of inputs needed to
conduct peace-support operations is subsequently addressed by focusing on
the UN experience in Liberia. Finally, an attempt is made to provide greater
clarity with regard to the direction of future UN peacekeeping in the African
context.
This article is not an attempt to sketch a gloomy picture of international
peace-support operations in Africa and further afield. Nor is it an effort to
allude to the shortcomings of the African continent in the international
community. Rather, it is an attempt to assess the challenges and perils
associated with peace-support operations in general and Africa in particulm:.
In a similar vein, it is an effort to reflect upon the magnitude and
implications of UN peace-support operations with specific reference to the
African continent.
AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE TO ESTABLISH UN PEACE-
SUPPORT OPERA nONS
The first of the objectives of the UN listed in its Charter is "to maintain
international peace and security, and to this end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". Concrete
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measures to achieve this purpose that are to be taken by the UN Security
Council are set out in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. 2
Chapter VI provides that international disputes "likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security" can be brought to the
attention of the Security Councilor the General Assembly. If the Security
Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression exists, the Council may use the broad powers given to it in
Chapter VII of the Charter. Should the Security Council regard it necessary,
it may take, under Article 42, "action by air, sea and land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". Article
43, however, requires unanimity within the Council before action is taken.
Provision is also made in the Charter for the UN and regional and sub-
regional organisations to form and maintain partnerships and act decisively
and expeditiously in devising approaches to crisis prevention, management
and resolution. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter covers this in article 53
which states that "[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its
authority".3
The UN does not have an army to perform peace-support actions. For
each peace-support mission, member states voluntarily provide troops and
equipment for which they are compensated from a special peacekeeping
budget. Police officers, election observers, human rights monitors and other
civilians sometimes work alongside military personnel in peace-support
• 4operatIOns.
Because the UN is the source of authority for types of peace-support
operations, its set of terms and definitions is of importance. An Agenda for
Peace has sought to identify a new approach to UN peacekeeping. It
suggested that it was no longer appropriate to consider peacekeeping in
isolation, and presented the concepts of preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding as a range of
options to be considered in the context of peace-support activities. None of
these concepts were really new, but were presented as a range of options to
be considered in the context of peace-support activities. In the report, the
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terms "preventive diplomacy", "peacemaking", "peacekeeping" and "post
conflict peacebuilding" were defined as follows:5
• Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into
conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
• Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement,
essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in
Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN.
• Peacekeeping is the development of a UN presence in the field,
hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally
involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently
civilians as well. Peacekeeping is also a technique that expands
the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making
of peace.
• Post-conflict peacebuilding is action to identify and support
structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to
avoid a relapse into conflict.
It is noteworthy that "peacemaking" refers to the use of diplomatic
means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a
peaceful settlement of their dispute. As with "preventive diplomacy", or
"preventive action", as it is currently referred to by the Secretary-General of
the UN, the UN can playa role only if the parties to the dispute agree that it
should do so. Peacemaking thus excludes the use of force against one of the
parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in UN parlance is
referred to as "peace enforcement".6 The notion "peace-support operations"
is now widely used in doctrine, for example, in documents of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to cover all "peacekeeping", "peace
enforcement" and related operations.
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There may be more than one reason for countries to become motivated
to participate in (l1ultinational peace-support operations. One reason may be
that peacekeeping is viewed by some governments as a means of keeping
the armed forces gainfully occupied. Other reasons may relate to
international influence and obligations as peacekeeping is sometimes
literally viewed as the epitome of international morality.
Until recently, some of the more traditional peacekeeping participants,
such as Canada and the Scandinavian countries, equated participation in
peacekeeping with "good international citizenship". However, indications
are that altruistic considerations are on the wane and stand to be replaced by
considerations of national prestige and own interest - particularly since
many newcomers were added to the number of peacekeeping nations since
the late 1980s.7
Speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom (UK), former Secretary of
State for Defence, Mr. Malcolm Ritkind, outlined the (then) British
perspective as follows: 8
"We need to consider the criteria against which the UK should judge
whether or not to become involved in a peacekeeping or peacemaking
mission. The first criterion must be the national interest... It is difficult
to predict where conflicts may lead, and wider strategic and security
interests, not always defence related, come into play."
Other factors considered by a country like the UK relate to its position
and commitments as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In
the case of the United States (US), US Presidential Decision Directive 25
clearly declares the following: 9
"When deciding whether to support a particular UN peace operation,
the United States will insist that fundamental questions be asked before
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new obligations are undertaken. These include an assessment of the
threat to international peace and security, a determination that the
peace operation serves US interests ..."
These considerations aside, the political wil1 of national governments
to contribute material and human resources to peace-support operations
depends in no smal1 terms on the effectiveness of the UN itself as reflected
in its ability to conduct peace-support operations successful1y. This would
seem to be especial1y relevant in the case of African peace-support
operations.
PROFILE OF COMPLETED PEACE-SUPPORT OPERAnONS IN
AFRICAIO
An investigation of completed UN peace-support operations indicates
that from the total of 32 operations, twelve were set up in Africa, seven in
the Americas, five in Asia, five in the Middle East and three in Europe. In
Africa, the fol1owing missions were established (in alphabetical order): II
UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) January 1989 to June 1991
UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) June 1991 to February 1995
UN Anl!ola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) February 1995 to June 1997
UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group for ChadlLibya May to June 1994
(UNASOG)
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) October 1993 to March 1996
UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) September 1993 to September 1997
UN Observer Mission for Uganda/Rwanda June 1993 to September 1994
(UNOMUR)
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) Julv 1960 to June 1964
UN Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) December 1992 to December 1994
UN Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) April 1992 to March 1993
UN Operations inSomalia II (UNOSOM II) March 1993 to March 1995
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in April 1989 to March 1990
Namibia
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Expenditures, human resources and fatalities
The above-mentioned UN peace-support operations have taken a toll as
regards expenditures, the utilisation of human resources and, in some cases,
fatalities, as indicated hereafter: 12
• UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM 1)13
Expenditures: $16404200 net
Strength: 70 military observers, supported by internationally and locally recruited
civilian staff
Fatalities: None
• UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM 11)14
Expenditures: $175 802600 net
Strength: 350 military observers, 126 police monitors; there were also some 80
international civilian staff and 155 local staff and up to 400 electoral
observers
Fatalities: 5 (2 military observers, I other military personnel, I police observer and
I international civilian staff)




from inception to 30 June ~997: $887 196700
as of 30 June 1997: mission total of 4 220 military personnel, composed
of283 military observers, 3 649 troops and 288 civilian personnel
32
• UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group for Chad/Libya (UNASOG)16
Exnenditures: $67471
Strength: 9 military observers and 6 international civilian staff
Fatalities: None
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from inception to 19April 1996: $437430100 net
some 5 500 military personnel, including approximately 5 200 troops and
military support personnel and 320 military observers, as well as 120
civilian police personnel; there was also a provision for internationally
and locally recruited civilian staff
26 (3 military observers, 22 other military personnel and I civilian police)
• UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)18
Expenditures: $81 488 699 net
Strength: See details below
Fatalities: None
• UN Observer Mission for UgandalRwanda (UNOMUR)'9
Expenditures: $2 298 500 net
Strength: 81 military observers, supported by internationally and locally recruited
civilian staff
Fatalities: None
• UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)2o
Exoenditures: $400 130793
Strength: 19 828 military personnel, supported by internationally and locally
recruited civilian staff
Fatalities: 250 (245 militarv personnel and 5 international civilian staff)
• UN Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)21
Exoenditures: $471 199200
Strength: 6 625 troops and military support personnel, 354 military observers and I
144 civilian police; there were also some 355 international staff and 506
local staff; in addition, during the polling, ONUMOZ deployed
approximately 900 electoral observers
Fatalities: 24 (21 military personnel, 2 civilian police and I international civilian
staff)
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• UN Operations in Somalia 1 (UNOSOM 1)22
Expenditures: $42 931 700 net
Strength: 50 military observers, 3 500 security personnel, up to 719 logistic support
personnel; there were also some 200 international civilian staff
Fatalities: 8 (military personnel)
• UN Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM 11)23
Expenditures: $1 643485500 net
Strength: Approximately 28 000 military and police personnel; there was also a
provision for some 2 800 internationally and locally recruited staff
Fatalities: 147 (143 military personnel, 3 international civilian staff and I local
staff)
• UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNT AG)24
Expenditures: $368584324
Strength: At maximum deployment, UNTAG's overall strength was approximately
8 000 consisting of some 4 500 military personnel, I 500 police officials
and 2 000 civilians
Fatalities: 19 (II military personnel, 4 civilian police, 3 international civilian staff
and I local staff)
Appraisal and evaluation
Against this background 5 of the 12 UN peace missions in Africa have
resulted in fatalities exceeding 20 lives on the part of UN peacekeepers. In
two of the five cases fatalities of more than 140 were reported.
Expenditures varied from $2 298 500 (UNOMUR) to $1 643 485 500
(UNOSOM II). In comparison with other international peace-support
operations the situation is as follows:
• In peace-support operations in the Americas none of the seven UN
peace missions has resulted in fatalities of more than 10 deaths on the
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part of UN peacekeepers. Expenditures varied from $88 573 157 in
the case of the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
between 1989 and 199225 to $315 794 700 in respect of the UN
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) between 1993 and 1996.26
• In Asia, only one of the five peace-support operations resulted in
fatalities, namely the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
.(UNT AC) between 1992 and 1993, where the loss of 78 lives was
reported. Substantially high expenditures were likewise only
compelled in the case of the UNT AC. It amounted to $1 620 963 300
- almost equal to that in Somalia.27
• In Europe, only the Yugoslav crisis compelled the UN to establish
peace missions. In Croatia, the UN Confidence Restoration
Operation (UNCRO) between 1995 and 1996 resulted in 16
fatalities.28 In the case of the UN Protection Force in the former
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) between 1992 and 1995, a loss of 167
lives was reported. Estimated expenditures in respect of the latter
amounted to an enormous $4 616 725556.29
• In Middle East peace-support operations, two of the five operations
resulted in substantial or serious fatalities/o namely a loss of 107
lives pertaining to the First UN Emergency Force in the Middle East
(UNEF I) between 1956 and 196731 and 55 as regards the Second UN
Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEFII) between 1973 and
1997.32 Expenditures varied from $177 895 000 in the case of the UN
Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) between 1988 and
199133 to $444 487 000 in respect ofUNEFII.34
The UN Department of Public Information rightly states that peace-
support operations "is dangerous business" and refers to the fact that 1 500
UN peace-keepers have died in the performance of their duties since 1945.35
Accordingly, participation in peace-support operations requires significant
commitments on the part of participating states, specifically the willingness
to accept financial costs and fatalities in the interest of promoting
international and regional stability.
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High fatalities can therefore have long term effects on a nation's
willingness to participate in future operations or even operations in a certain
part of the world. In fact, with the rise in fatalities sustained by UN
missions in the 1990s worldwide, a number of countries have increasingly
become reluctant to commit their forces. For any democratic government it
is extremely difficult to justify fatalities in peace-support operations where
clear and compelling interests cannot be identified. In addition, the costs of
such operations and the massive logistic commitment with regard to long
distance operations - as in the case of Africa - are key factors in the
decision-making processes of responsible governments.
The second most costly and most numerously staffed international
peace-support operation to date was that of Somalia. Only UNPROFOR,
the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia, involved more costs and
personnel on the part of the UN. The Somali experience, in particular, has
provided important lessons for all potential African peace-support
operations. Major operational challenges in Somalia were posed by
problems relating to geography, transportation and the complex political
system. In general, Africa's artificial borders, combined with decades of
colonial manipulation and economic exploitation, almost guarantee that the
continent's circumstances provide serious and expensive challenges for
peacekeepers. Likewise, the lack of infrastructural development and the
political intractability of most African conflicts inevitably cause the
financial costs of peace-support operations to remain relatively high. 36
Generally speaking, African peace-support operations seem to be an
even greater challenge than those in most other parts of the world are. The
"messy" nature of peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique
and Angola have, in fact, resulted in an increasing reluctance on the part of
the major powers and the traditional troop-contributing nations to deploy on
African soil.37 In Rwanda, for example, a three-year UN 'peacekeeping'
operation failed to halt ethnic genocide that resulted in between 500 000 and
one million deaths. In spite of the UN's efforts to restore peace, a silent
genocide continued in Rwanda.38
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In view of the above, cognisance must be taken of the fact that Europe
is by no means an island of peace. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
and the Caucasus region, the tensions in Cyprus and the fragile peace
process in the Middle East are important security concerns in the European
community. All this is happening on Europe's doorstep. And in Russia,
Ukraine and other eastern European countries, democracy and market
economies are still by no means so firmly established as to be irreversible.
There remain a number of unsolved and deeply-rooted tensions and
potential conflicts.39 These factors are likely to have significant
implications for the commitment or willingness of European countries -
which form a most important part of the resource base of the UN - to take
part in multinational efforts to restore stability and security on the African
continent in the short to medium-term.
In the case of the US it would seem that Africa's physical remoteness
from the core of US interests has not encouraged a proper focus on the
challenges or the means to address African conflicts. For example, in 1995
the US was celebrating the Dayton Accord that brought an end to the
destructive war in the former Yugoslavia; a conflict that recorded the deaths
of 250 000 people. In more or less the same period, between 1992 and
1994, at least 500 000 people died in Angola - twice the number in half the
time - and no less were massacred inca few months during 1994, in Rwanda.
However, the US did not address these conflicts with the same apparent
focus and energy.40 At the same time, it must be remembered that the US
vividly recalls the peace-support operation in Somalia in 1993 where 18
American soldiers were killed and a US soldier was being dragged through
the streets of Mogadishu. Since then, Washington has been reluctant to
commit US troops to African missions. in the light of the preceding, the
American as well as the French and British views on African peacekeeping
requirements are today strongly oriented to pursue an African approach in
resolving African conflicts.4\
Scientia Militaria - 28( 1) 1998 123
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 1, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
THE MAGNITUDE OF CONDUCTING PEACE-SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
Traditionally, there are five sources from which the UN derives logistic
support: the UN held infrastructure; logistic units provided by member
states; commercial sources; member states via 'stand alone national
agreements' and support provided independently by member states for
'fi . 42speci IC operatIOns.
Peace-support missions used to take three to six months to be fully
deployed. With the demand for quick and complex peacekeeping following
the end of the Cold War, member states and the Secretary-General have
been seeking ways to reduce deployment time considerably. The new
generation peace-support operations, with political, humanitarian and
military dimensions required greater co-ordination and liaison than before.
This has made it essential that the relevant departments and agencies of the
UN machinery function in an integrated manner. Within the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, particular effort and resources have been devoted
to the development of the planning process, focusing on the operational and
logistic planning and on the co-ordination of the liaison functions. The
Mission Planning Service, as part of the Planning Division, is the nucleus of
h. 43t IS process.
The Liberian peacekeeping effort
The magnitude of peace-support operations places an extremely high
premium on UN administration, organisation, co-ordination and resources.
Managing multilateral inputs are especially important in respect of the
clarification of the general concept of the operation; negotiations with troop
contributing nations; drafting a contribution agreement between the UN and
troop contributing member states concerning reimbursement for personnel
and equipment; producing guidelines for troop-contributing nations to
provide guidance for preparations; issuing general guidelines for the force
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commander, and organising the military component. Similarly, determining
the logistic requirements, host-nation support, services to be provided by the
UN, contracts concerning civilian personnel; drafting the budget and
devising the development plan are matters that need to be addressed and
managed.44 Multiple inputs from the UN machinery and various role-
players are thus needed to conduct a peace-support operation as, for
example, illustrated by the following basic information on UNOMIL, the
UN Observer Mission in Liberia between September 1993 and September
1997.45
• Authorization
UNOMIL was established to work alongside ECOMOG, the Economic
Community of West African States 'Monitoring Group' to facilitate the
Cotonou Peace Agreement of 1993, which had been signed by the
conflicting parties. The mission was authorised and managed in accordance
with various Security Council resolutions:
866 (1993) of22 September 1993 1020 (1995) of 10November 1995
911 (1994) of21 Apri11994 1041 (1996) of29 January 1996
950 (1994) of 21 October 1994 1059 (1996) of 31 May 1996
972 (1995) of 13 January 1995 1071 (1996) of 30 August 1996
985 (1995) of 13April 1995 1083 (1996) of27 November 1996
1001 (1995) of 30 June 1995 1100 (1997) of 27 March 1997
1014 (1995) of 15 September 1116 (1997) of27 June 1997
1995
The many Security Council resolutions were basically the result of
persistent instability, continuing factional hostilities and an uncertain
commitment of the country's political leaders to furthering the peace
process.
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• Special representatives of the Secretary-General and Heads of
Mission
The effectiveness of any UN operation is inextricably tied to the quality
of its command-and-control arrangements in-theater and to the quality of the
communication links between the functionaries in New York and the
mission in the field. In this regard, the Special Representatives of the
Secretary-General and Force Commanders play an important role to ensure
sound communication and a clear chain of command between the UN
decision-making apparatus in New York and the peace-support effort on the
ground. These persons also serve as primary reporting instruments
pertaining to the operational situation. In Liberia, the following persons
served successively as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General:
Livingstone Gordon-Somers I November 1992 to November 1994
In addition, the following persons served respectively as force
commanders of the mission:
October 1993 to May 1995
December 1995 to June 1996
June to December 1996
December 1996 to Seotember 1997
• Strength
The intensely political character of contemporary peace-support tasks
and frequent mandate renewals by the Security Council often involve
changes to the composition of a mission. In Liberia, the strength of the UN
mission had to be determined in accordance with fluctuating circumstances
and comprised the following staff components:
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Authorized from 22 September 1993 to 9
November 1995
Authorized beginning 10November 1995
Military strength during the electoral period
(July 1997)
• Financing and voluntary contributions
303 military observers, 20 military medical
ersonnel and 24 military engineers
160 military observers supported by military
medical personnel, 105 international civilians
and 550 local civilian staff and 120 UN
volunteers.
92 military observers,
observers and 7 milita
At the strategic level the responsibility for planning, orgamsmg,
mounting, sustaining and accounting for authorised UN operations lies with
the UN functionaries in New York. Specifically, this involves the
integration of all sources of supply on the one hand, and co-ordination
between the various sources of support on the other. As far as UNOMIL
was concerned, the financing details were as follows:
Method of financing Assessment in resoect of a Soecial Account
Estimated expenditure From inception of mission until 31 December
1996: $81 488 600 net
Budget estimate from I July 1997 through 30 $19,7 million
June 1998







United States $22 190400
United Kingdom $1 000 000 (for humanitarian
assistance)
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• Contributions of military personnel
The independent states that are signatories to the UN Charter form the
resource base of the UN. The military personnel who serve in peace-
support operations are thus provided by the member states on a voluntary
basis - albeit for different reasons or motivating factors. In Liberia, the
following countries helped to staff the UN mission:
Appraisal and evaluation
In the context of the preceding, it goes without saying that peace-
support operations generally involve a magnitude of inputs to be arranged
and co-ordinated by the UN machinery. Although the Secretary-Gen~ral
through the managerial capacities inherent in his Executive Office
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nominally directs peace-support operations, it is the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations that is responsible for direction in the field. It
must be realised, however, that the UN does not have a tried and tested
package for peace-support operations and evaluates each situation on its
merits.
Although the political will of member states is fundamentally related to
perceptions of national interest, it is not, however, immutable. The
perceived effectiveness of the UN itself is one of the factors that can
influence it. This relates, then, to the assumption that there is a direct
relationship between the effectiveness of the UN as an institution and the
willingness of member states to commit political resources and capital to
enhance international peace-support activities.46
Against this background, it should be noted that material and
organisational factors have often undermined the military effectiveness of
UN missions in the field. Accordingly, the organisation's deficiency in
respect of logistic planning and support have regularly impaired the
operational efficiency of UN forces.47
In Rwanda, for example, UNAMIR was faced with some of the old
problems that have plagued other UN peace-support operations: troops were
inadequately equipped and needed such equipment as armoured personnel
carriers and even helmets and bulletproof vests. The mission relied on
armoured personnel carriers in less than satisfactory condition for moving
troops from one part of Rwanda to the other. During the height of the
Rwandan crisis, food, medicine and other essentials ran dangerously low.
Some of these problems were a result of the protracted process of obtaining
financing for the mission, followed by a long procurement process for
supplies and equipment. A delay in appointing a Chief Administrative
Officer early in the mission's life added to these problems. In addition,
troops for UNAMIR were scarce. During the first phase of the mission, the
only offer of troops for logistical support came from Bangladesh. The UN
had no choice but to accept, even though it was apparent that the
Bangladeshi battalion did not have a sufficient resource base to provide the
logistical support needed.48
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It should furthennore be noted that as a result of unpaid contributions
to peacekeeping accounts the UN has struggled to settle a $1 billion debt in
1996/97 owed to 81 member states which provided troops and equipment.
At the end of 1996, the UN owed Pakistan $67 million and India $58
million for their contributions to peace-support operations. Understandably,
member states have become sensitive about high costs and are more
reluctant to participate in peace-support operations in the light of a UN
budget deficit.49
The financial restraints under which the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations has had to operate in recent years, both because of
the increase in the number of intra-state conflicts and the failure of states to
make their payments, have inhibited effective action on the part of the world
body. On a positive note, it would seem that progress has been made
recently towards resolution of the latter problem50 and it is hoped that a
satisfactory outcome will emerge in future. In the final analysis, it must be
realised that the real cost of peace-support operations must ultimately be
measured against the cost of the alternative - war.
What is significant in view of the above is the point that the UN now
seems prepared to hand over responsibility for peace and security to willing
regional organisations and alliances. In the case of UNOMIL, the more
robust 'peacekeeping' was done by ECOMOG, while the UN mission was
deployed to observe the 'peace-keepers' as well as the belligerents.
Moreover, the Security Council has stretched the UN Charter to its limits as
regards peacekeeping in the Central African Republic, when the Inter-
African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement
(MISAB) was mandated on 6 August 1997 to take responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security. As far as the UN was concerned, UN
member states were not assessed for any portion of the mission costs which
had to be borne by the participating countries.51
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FUTURE UN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING
For the UN there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no
greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The UN is clearly aware of
the fact that the international community's perception of peace-support
operations has been greatly shaped by the UN's experience in African
countries.
African countries have begun to make economic and political progress
in recent years, but in some parts of the continent progress remains
threatened or impeded by conflict. The question is: Where is African
peacekeeping heading? If the report of Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary-General
of the UN, on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace
and Sustainable Development in Africa is to be taken as a pointer towards
the future of UN involvement in African peacekeeping requirements, it
would seem that the organisation is eager to add momentum to Africa's
renewed quest for peace and greater prosperity. Three aspects are of special
relevance:
• The Secretary-General holds the view that under the right conditions,
UN peace-support operations can make the difference between peace
and war in Africa. However, his view includes the realisation that
UN peacekeeping will not always be the best answer to every problem
in Africa or elsewhere. Yet, where opportunities in Africa arise, the
international community should provide its support, demonstrating its
commitment to peace in a tangible way.
• Most important is the Secretary-General's view that the provision of
support for regional and sub-regional initiatives is regarded as both
necessary and desirable. It is necessary because the UN lacks the
capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may
arise in Africa. It is also desirable because, wherever possible, the
international community should strive to complement rather than
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supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems. By the same
token, reinforcing the capacity of African countries to operate in
peace-support operations is a key priority, whether those operations
take place in the framework of a UN mission or are conducted by a
regional organisation or group of states in accordance with Security
Council authority. The Secretary-General recognises that, in recent
years, there have been a number of new African initiatives to resolve
disputes that have long plagued particular areas or to tackle new
conflicts before they can expand and escalate beyond control. The
activities of ECOMOG in Liberia are especially regarded as an
example of co-operation between the UN and a sub-regional
organisation that might be applicable to future situations.
• The view is also held that wide disparities in the international
community's commitment to preventing or containing conflicts in
different regions impede the ability of the UN to promote a stable and
just international order anywhere. Member states must therefore be
engaged in terms of political will and practical resources if the
viability of the UN and the principle for which it stands are to be
safeguarded, let alone advanced.
In addition, summoning the necessary political will is at stake.
According to Khopi Annan, this relates to two aspects:
• Firstly, that Africa must demonstrate the will to rely upon political
rather than military responses to problems. African countries must
likewise summon the will to take good governance seriously,
ensuring human rights and the rule of law, strengthening
democratisation and promoting transparency in public administration.
• Secondly, political will is also needed from the international
community. Where the international community is committed to
making a difference, it has proved that significant and rapid
transformation can be achieved.
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It is furthermore realised that the credibility of the UN in Africa to a
great extent depends upon the international community's willingness to act
and to explore new means of advancing the objectives of peace and security
on the continent. It is therefore important for the organisation to be guided
by lessons from its experience in Africa in order to support the continent in
the search for economic and political progress. 52
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above that each UN peace-support operation places
an extremely high premium on UN administration, organisation, co-
ordination and resources, and that a multiplicity of inputs by various role-
players is needed. Moreover, the new generation peace-support operations,
with political, humanitarian and military dimensions require greater co-
ordination and liaison than before. This has made it essential that the
relevant departments and agencies of the UN machinery function in an
integrated manner. This is also of special importance, as it would appear
that there is a relationship between the effectiveness of the UN as an
institution and the willingness of member states to commit resources and
capital to enhance international peace-support activities.
It is furthermore clear that partisipation in peace-support operations
require significant commitments on the part of participating states,
specifically the willingness to accept financial costs and fatalities in the
interest of promoting international and regional stability. High fatalities can
therefore have long term effects on a nation's willingness to participate in
future operations or even operations in a certain part of the world. In fact,
with the rise in fatalities sustained by UN missions in the I990s worldwide,
a number of countries have increasingly become reluctant to commit their
forces. For any democratic government it is extremely difficult to justifY
fatalities in peace-support operations where clear and compelling interests
cannot be identified. In addition, the costs of such operations and the
massive logistic commitment for long distance operations - as in the case of
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African conflicts - are key factors in the decision-making processes of
responsible governments.
Africa is a continent that is steeped in conflict, the sources of which are
both diverse and endemic. Therefore, African peace-support operations
seem to be an even greater challenge than those in most other parts of the
world are. Past and recent experiences in the conducting of African peace-
support operations have indicated that such operations present serious
challenges and a hostile operational environment to forces assuming a
peace-support role. It is accordingly a truism that the undertaking of peace-
support operations in Africa is by no means a simple and easy task.
The difficulties and perils associated with peacekeeping in Somalia,
Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola have already resulted in an increasing
reluctance on the part of the major powers and the traditional troop-
contributing nations to deploy their troops on African soil. As a result of
this, the American, French and British proposals with regard to African
peacekeeping requirements are currently oriented to pursue an African
approach in resolving African conflicts.
It must furthermore be realised that the continent's physical remoteness
from the core of Western interests does not encourage a proper focus on the
challenges or the means to address them. Accordingly, it can be concluded
that the real impact of the post-Cold War era is that the burden of resolving
African conflicts rests more and more on Africans themselves. African
countries and organisations are therefore compelled to take measures and
develop strategies to address the peacekeeping requirements on the
continent. This would imply that the practice of deploying regional and
sub-regional peace forces might become of increasing relevance and
significance in the African context. However, poverty in a large number of
countries reduces their ability to deal effectively with intra-state conflicts.
As a result, the UN and the Western world are likely to be saddled with at
least the material cost of UN peace-support operations on the African
continent in the foreseeable future.
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